27-08-2021
Maciej Wojtal (Should you invest in Iranian equities?)
00:00:20 How Maciej got started with Amtelon Capital and why he chose Iran as a primary investment target?00:05:33 Why is Iran like Russia (and Eastern Europe ) in the 1990s? Is there a catalyst for Iran making it back to be connected with the rest of the world?00:14:25 A short story of sanctions against Iran.00:26:06 How Iranians and the regime in Iran differ? Why is the regime so successful in controlling power?00:32:32 What are great businesses to invest in Iran?00:48:11 How Iran avoided the 'Dutch disease' of big commodity exporters.00:56:08 Is Iran starting to be a new part of an 'Axis power'? Will this hamper the participation of outside investors in the Iranian market?
Maciej Wojtal is the founder and CIO of Amtelon Capital which is focused on investing in Iranian equities. Maciej has worked with Citigroup and JP Morgan before running his own fund.
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Torsten Jacobi: Maciej, welcome to the Podcast. Thanks for coming on, really appreciate that.
Maciej Wojtal: Yes, thank you for having me here.
Torsten Jacobi: Hey, absolutely. You run something really interesting and you are the cofounder and the CIO of Amtalan Capital, which really focuses on investing primarily in equities in Iran, from what I understand. That sounds really cool, really unique. I have never heard about an investment fund out there that actually invests in Iran. How did that happen? How did you get started on why Iran? Why not something that's a little more politically correct, so to speak?
Maciej Wojtal: Yes, well, it is super exciting. And when I speak to the local regulator in Iran, they tell us that we are their favorite foreign investor, foreign institutional investor, because we are the only one. There is really no other foreign institutional investor in Iran, so we are the only ones. So I decided to launch Amtalan Capital back in 2016, when JCPOA, the nuclear agreement, was implemented. And the reason why Iran and not something else was actually pretty simple. There was no other market. There's still there is still no other market at this moment in the world with lower evaluations, a higher growth potential, both like a long term structural growth potential, as well as near term growth that will be coming from the reopening of the country or reintegration of the country with the rest of the world. And to be honest, this is potentially the last opportunity of this size. So the type of opportunity, I mean, is a transformational opportunity. So country going from one situation, because it's not from one system to another, I don't expect any political, you know, revolution or transformation there. But the economic situation will change, will change from a, you know, decades of sanctions, where the economy was basically cut off from the rest of the world to the economy that is slowly opening up, catching up with the rest of emerging markets, with everything good that happened in the rest of the emerging markets over the last two decades. And on top of that, no one is there. So Americans cannot touch it. So all the big funds out there have to wait until the primary US sanctions are lifted. So suddenly you get, you get to go to a new market like this of this size and invest before the big US funds go there. It doesn't happen too often. And what I mean of this size, what I mean by this size is, you know, that's another unique thing is that you may have some frontier markets that you can get excited about because of demographics, you know, growth potential, whatever. But usually they have no capital markets. You can go and launch startups, build a factory, a bank, whatever. And here you already have pretty well developed capital markets, stock market with 600 companies. Right now it's around $250 billion market cap. Back in 2016, it was already $100 billion market cap. And right now several hundred million dollars turnover per day. And so, you know, big enough market to be attractive even for big investors. I mean, too big to ignore basically. And for us with a new fund, startup fund that wants to basically focus on this niche and do the initial fundraising and so on. Well, there was looked as an amazing setup with everything that we needed in place. So hence the decision. And, you know, the important thing is that I had no connections to Iran. So I actually had never met an Iranian in my life before my first visit to Tehran. So I had no bias. It wasn't the case that, you know, my, I don't know, half of my family was actually from Iran. So it was somehow convenient for me to focus on this market and maybe travel more, whatever. No, I was able to focus on any market out there. And Iran was just based on the risk reward that I saw there. Risk being obviously geopolitics, but it seemed to be at that time turning in, you know, with the more positive momentum and rewards coming from the lowest valuations in the world. And all this and all this growth potential look to me like, yeah, exactly like the best risk reward out there.
Torsten Jacobi: Yeah. So it's either very gutsy or very crazy decision that you made a couple years back. I hope it's the former. One thing that I heard you talk about on another show is that you compared Iran right now to a post 1990s Russia. Eastern Germany that is very low earnings to valuation ratios. You had, where, yeah, just the climate where everyone had this this appreciation of change, appreciation of the future. Entrepreneurship was strong and was really grassroots. I will be seeing now in the U.S. where you need to be a $3 billion. No, it's something where we all fell. Then I was part of that in Eastern Germany, where we all fell. The future is kind of in our hands. I mean, they did this grassroots, massive collabs, grassroots entrepreneurship, as he describes it, what we are missing. And it really drove these in Eastern Europe really quickly into what a decent part of the European community where they are right now, rather than 10, 15 years. It happened really quickly. Why do you say Iran is at a similar precipice? And do you see any catalyst that it will very quickly, say the next 10 years, will be more like a normal Middle East country, which is, you know, the Middle Eastern countries all are, they have quite a bit of turmoil. At least some of them. We just talked about Syria and a couple of episodes ago. What do you think Iran is at a precipice?
Maciej Wojtal: Yeah, look, so it is fair to compare it to Eastern Europe in the 90s. It's not the same. It's always different. But what I mean by that is that certain dynamics may be similar. So going from one system that is restricted in some way, in Eastern Europe, it was, you know, socialism slash communism, and this, people were entrepreneurial, but they were not free to really, to really, you know, do what they wanted to do. And then after 1989, all this unlocked. So in Eastern Europe after 1989, all this energy was unlocked, basically, and people started really wanted to work and they started chasing their dreams. And this, and you could see this entrepreneurial entrepreneurship in action. It was quite chaotic in the 90s. You know, I lived in the 90s in Poland, and it was chaos. I mean, there were, you know, institutions were not working properly. It was corrupt. Bureaucracy was a huge headache. It was absolutely a mess in many places. But it worked. And the pace of changes was amazing. So everything was very dynamic. So after 10 or 20 years, Poland changed completely. And the rest of Eastern Europe, it became much more stable, much more easy to forecast, but also hence much more institutionalized in every corner. But hence also the, you know, your expected return also much closer to the mean, let's say, to whatever from, I don't know, investing in real estate right now in Eastern Europe is similar to Western Europe, actually, in terms of your risk reward. So this is what I expect in Iran. A similar growth coming from people who are entrepreneurial and from foreign investment. Because look, the same, the same role as Eastern Europe played for Western Europe in the 90s, for Germany mainly, but also France, Italy, where Eastern Europe was basically a hub, a source of cheap labor, where it made total sense to locate your factories over there, take advantage of this cheap labor force, and then also be ready to benefit from the growing middle class that was showing up there like 10 or 20 years later. And suddenly it was, you know, it became an important consumer market. Same thing will happen in Iran. I mean, Iran, look, Iran is quite a big country. It's 84 million people. They have the largest oil and gas reserves combined, oil and gas reserves in the world. Plenty of zinc and zinc and copper resources as well. But the most important resource is the population, is the Iranian population. It's a well educated society with a median age of 30 years old, where I think it's not, it's unlike the rest of the Middle East. It's not very similar to other Middle Eastern countries. It's, you know, the sense of 5,000 years of history that they have is you can feel that. And this is what's been important for them generation after generation, so this focus on education and so on. So you have very skilled labor force, which because of the sanctions, is right now cheaper than in Vietnam. So, you know, the average salary is probably around $200 in Iran. You can even hire computer scientists, so people who can code for, you know, 800 bucks, whereas, you know, even in usually Novgorod somewhere in the middle of Russia, it costs you $3,000, right, to hire someone. So, right now for you, if you're a big, you know, European or Asian company corporation and want to, looking for a place to manufacture stuff, and then also to start promoting your brand because you will find, you know, you want to be present in the new consumer market, it's a no brainer to go there. But also, you know, it's not only that, it's not only these 84 million people because Iran has very good links with other countries in the region. All the neighbors, so Iran plus all the neighboring countries, it's 500, more than 500 million people. And countries like Iraq or Afghanistan, which is obviously in the news right now, they import most of their products from Iran, the products they consume from Iran, not only oil or gasoline, but, you know, food, cars, car parts, even cement, so things that are not that easy to import. So, companies that are based in Iran are well positioned to export in the whole region. So, this is another argument for big multinationals to go to Iran, as soon as, you know, geopolitics set up. So, this is one, another reason why I think that, you know, it could be similar to Eastern Europe. Of course, the differences are big as well because, you know, Eastern Europe, or at least, you know, Central Europe was on the path to NATO and then European Union quite quickly. So, nothing like this will happen in Iran. But what will, what might be similar, and I think will be similar, is that big investment, big FDI investment should come from European, major European companies, you know, which are already there. A lot of Swiss and German companies and French and Italian companies are already there, have been operating under the radar throughout the Trump administration, just not to get into trouble, but have been, you know, patiently waiting for, for an opportunity to scale up their, their operations. And we are in talk, we are in touch with them with, we're speaking with all of them to understand what's going on. And, and yes, and they're all thinking about expanding their operations, same for big Japanese companies.
Torsten Jacobi: Well, when we, we just talked about sanctions, but only briefly, and I think this is, this is a huge catalyst, right? So maybe we, we, we roll up at this story of sanctions a little bit, right? So from what I know, this is very limited, the sanctions were put in place for the nuclear, uranium enrichment, that a lot of countries were concerned that there's a nuclear weapon that Iran will build and use against Israel. I think that was the biggest concern, a really near term concern. And then it was an agreement reached, I think it was under the Obama administration that they stopped doing this. They only use it for civilian purposes for a couple of nuclear power plants. And then once they adhere to this, it would be, and that was, I think the story of the end of the Obama administration, that was basically catalyst for working with Iran with less sanctions, right? So there's still sanctions in place with much less. And then Trump came around, a picture changed in Iran was that the big, big bogeyman, based on the analysis of that administration, that there was a lot of states funded terrorism. And we know that Iran does it through a proxies. And obviously what's terrorism and what's the freedom fight, it's very difficult to say sometimes, right? So we do know that there is a gray line, a gray zone, that we see this in Taliban, with the Taliban in Afghanistan, who were friends, enemies. Now they are like an administration really, really don't know what they are and who they are to an extent. So maybe you can help us understand what happened to these sanctions. Are they justified? And do you think they just going to go away very soon under the Biden administration, which would be obviously huge catalyst?
Maciej Wojtal: So there are many different types of sanctions. And those sanctions have been in place for quite a long time. I mean, you know, the first, the first event that influenced the relations between Iran and the US was obviously the Iranian Revolution, 1979. And the takeover of, of, of the US embassy and the American hostages. So, you know, it happened a long time ago. But it's based on what I, what I managed to, to find out and understand. This is something that basically poisoned the relations for the, you know, decades to come. It's, it's, it's actually amazing. But this, this, this one event was so strong that it fueled the, you know, the propaganda on both sides, meaning American politicians were using this argument to, you know, to portray Iran as the, as the bad actor always, and, and, and, and was very much in line, you know, with the recent history and, and with the sentiment in the US. Iran obviously did the opposite. I mean, the same thing, but towards the US in its own country. So, you know, death to America for the last 40 or 50 years. And, and, and, and this is the, the, the big Satan and the whole poll, maybe not the policy, but, you know, the philosophy of the country is very much centered around, you know, the active fight against, you know, the US. So it's a problem because that when they sit down and want to talk, it's just much more difficult because even if they want to make a deal quickly and smoothly and they agree on the principles, they have a lot of this sentiment that is a very, you know, long term and well established on both sides that they need to deal with. So I think this is actually the biggest issue in speaking to each other. Then at some point they also had, you know, more hard line leadership on both sides, right? So either, you know, on the US side, when Iran was getting into the axis of evil or any, you know, this type of philosophy, then in Iran, you had Ahmadinejad, who was, you know, basically talking about removing Israel from the map and, and firing missiles and, and he got, I think, the, the very heavy UN sanctions on the country where even Russia and China voted to impose, you know, sanctions on Iran. So, and that was, I think, you know, somewhere between 2009 and 2013. So what changed later, and then Obama actually initially increased sanctions on Iran before making a move offering to negotiate an offering to, to side the nuclear deal, which happened in 2015, was implemented 2016. And the nuclear deal said that UN sanctions were lifted, and US secondary sanctions were lifted. So what was left were US primary sanctions. Now, what that means is, so US primary sanctions basically say that Americans cannot touch Iran. They cannot invest there. They cannot do business with Iranians and so on. Nothing. And US secondary sanctions say that everyone else should not be doing, you know, either the same thing as Americans or, or to a less extent. So what happened was that the secondary sanctions were lifted. UN sanctions were lifted. So suddenly all non US persons were allowed to engage with Iran. And that was in 2016. That was, you know, where we got involved with Iran, why there was a lot of excitement in Europe, especially about, you know, business in Iran, because the legal obstacles were gone. Now, this, this obviously changed with the change of the US administration. But that was, but that was the situation then. And look, like the big, big opening, meaning when Americans could start to invest in the country in Iran, Iran could happen after primary sanctions were lifted. But this, this will be a longer time process. I mean, this will require a Congress approval. This will require, so Republicans will have to be, I think at least 10 Republicans will have to be on board. So it will not happen soon. And it would have to be combined with, with also, you know, other things that Iran would commit to. So not only the nuclear, the uranium enrichment that you mentioned. So, so yes, okay. So going back to Obama, Obama said, you stop uranium enrichment. And, and we, and we lift the secondary sanctions. And, well, pretty much this, this is what happened. Now, what Obama wanted in the long term. And then what Trump said was that, okay, but we want you to also stop doing other things, like meddling in the region. So stop sponsoring all the, all the militias, all the, all the groups across the region that are causing problems. And, and also stop working on your missiles on your ballistic systems. So when Iran hears that, they are saying, well, first of all, missiles, I think it's a no go. They will, I think they will never agree to, to stop working on, on, on, on their, well, defense systems or missile systems, they say it's only defense systems. Why? Well, they look after the revolution. So 79, where the country was, you know, still not well set up. Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq at that time, attacked Iran, using actually a lot of weapons that he got from Americans. And Iran didn't have any missiles at that time. And they couldn't defend against, you know, what, what, what, what Hussein was throwing, throwing at them. And at that time, Iran actually reached out for help, you know, Europe, the US, to the neighbors, and so on. And they didn't get any help from anyone. And now they are using this argument. And I think it actually makes sense that, look, we have the right to protect ourselves. We experienced, you know, a serious eight year war that was devastating. No one helped us. So sorry, but we will not negotiate on that. And so this is one argument. And then when it comes to, you know, the, the groups working in the region, well, it's more nuanced. I mean, obviously, the US will say, look, these are terrorists, and you're just supporting terrorists. Iran will say, look, as you, as you pointed out, these are freedom fighters, or these are Shia minorities in a Sunni, Sunni region. And, you know, and they need help because they are a minority and, and everyone around them is aggressive. So we are just supporting our own. And this is, or we are supposed to supporting, you know, Palestine, or, or the minority in Lebanon, or, or Yemenis, or Shia minority in Nigeria, actually. So yes, this is, this is the philosophy. Then, you know, the US will say, which is a valid argument, look, they behave like terrorists. So, you know, their tactics are like terrorists. So, so that's why, you know, they are terrorists. And, you know, and, and, and the argument, it's, it's not, it's not easy to, to resolve. So, I think it will be, for Iran, it's also part of their defense strategy. Let's say that they are getting involved in the region before anything comes to Iran. Look, Iran is the most stable country in the region. Like really nothing, nothing happens there. Tehran, city of 10 million people, 10pm at night, you see women walking by themselves, nothing is happening. And it's not because police is on every corner. No, it's just, it's just pretty safe. Okay, probably I stick to the better parts of Tehran. But still, okay, it's a 10 million city, 10 million people city. So everything is happening in the city. And, and, you know, in the center, you just feel safe. And they say, Okay, that's partly because we do, we are active in the region, and we don't wait for the problems to come to us. So, well, these are, these are, this is what they're discussing about. I don't think that the Iranians would, that it will be easy to make Iranians just stop getting involved or stop working on their missiles. Unless there is like a really long term incentive, long term deal, where they would get a lot, they would benefit a lot from the only something like this would make them, you know, change their strategy, change their behavior.
Torsten Jacobi: Yeah. Well, you know, but what's, what's very difficult from the outside, and you are an Iranian insider now, that's why I'm asking, it's, and I noticed from Eastern Germany, think about it, how difficult it was to see what is what the people on the ground, the actual people who live in that country, what is their opinion, and what is an oppressive government, tyrannic government opinion, right? So we see this in North Korea, we see this in Iran, we kind of assume this for China, maybe true or not, we assume this for Russia, maybe true or not. But we have trouble and I think the US is always very careful to make that distinction, even though it gets lost. We know it is, there's people on the ground who have maybe very different incentives, very different goals, very different objectives, very different opinions, but they are not, they're not allowed, they are not able to, to really create a voice in that country because of suppression, or maybe because they are too stupid, you know, you can say this about Eastern Europe, why did the revolution in 89 not happen in 96 or 49? That's a very interesting discussion to have, I think. So what, when you, and you said that earlier, there isn't a big political revolution that you see coming up, and I think the US was very supportive when there's demonstrations and then they die down after two days because people lose their jobs, and you know, there's a lot of ramifications from this. When you, when you get a sense of what people on the ground actually feel, even though they are not able to officially say that, and maybe that this event, but what do you think are the goals of the population? Do they differ from the administration? Is that something you can talk about?
Maciej Wojtal: Yes, so I think it's, in Iran you have, it's a, it's a, it's a quite diverse society. So you have, you know, different parts of population may, may think in a bit different way. So the wealthy parts of Tehran are, in terms of their mindset, in terms of their aspirations, ambitions, the lifestyle that they would like to have, it's, it's very much like, like Western Europe, like, like the Western world. The same goes in terms of how religious they are, their, what, what they need, what they want in terms of personal, you know, freedom, political freedom, and so on. On the other hand, when you go to smaller cities, people are much more conservative. You can even see this in the way, you know, they dress, the way, you know, what, what lifestyle they have, which is much more religious, much more dogmatic in terms of mindset. So, so yeah, so it's, so it's not the case that, you know, all Iranians think the same. There is no opposition in the country. For, you know, different reasons, I probably think it's, it's similar to China, which, which is a, you know, it's a, it's a, it's a quite an efficient machine, right, that is working there, the system, and, and that's it, and it's just controlling everything. So I think it's just similar, similar picture there. And so, but people, you know, at least over the last, you know, four years, when it was really tough, I mean, and it was really depressing, depressing because they had a lot of hope. It was amazing. It was so much hope like 2016, 17. And then Trump came over and, and, and this hope was crushed, right? So without getting into argument, whether, you know, what was justified was what not. Just what I, what I saw when I talked to people was that they're optimism, you know, and, and, and hope that I could see 2016 was gone, completely gone. And, but still, you couldn't sense that people suddenly thinking about, you know, revolution going out on the street and not, I don't know, fighting with the government or who, or whoever, whoever, people were more always focused on evolution. So they won't change. They want, like everywhere, usually want the system to change in one way or another, maybe in Iran, a bit more, but, but more for evolution than revolution. That's, that there was always my, my sense, maybe, maybe it might change, but I've, this is what I've always experienced.
Torsten Jacobi: Yeah, I remember the days of 89, when, you know, people were on the streets, but it was all, I mean, it was 99, 99.9% peaceful, right? And then people were like, well, simply if you want to go to Western Germany for a couple of days, and they were like, okay, you can go, but you have to, like, go through this process, right? And then a week later, they said, oh, you can still go, but you can't, you can only go to Berlin. And then a week later, they were like, okay, you can go wherever you want. And a week later, okay, now you get, the Western Germany would give you money when you come over, right? Just to visit Western Germany. It was a very interesting program. And this changed so quickly, like it was an evolution, but the evolution was every week, there was a different reaction to that pressure. So I feel like it always starts with an evolution, but the speed of the evolution looks to the outside of like a revolution, like nobody wants violence. So I think this is true for both sides.
Maciej Wojtal: So it's a different pace in Iran, because I think it's more driven by demographics than, than political events, you know, in Eastern Europe, things had a catalyst and it just started, started happening quickly. In Iran, this is actually a similarity with, with other Middle Eastern countries is that, you know, whatever philosophy was the dominant one back in 1979, and over the following, you know, two decades, it cannot be the same philosophy right now, because the majority of the population were born after the revolution, and they just cannot relate to the slogans to, you know, to this, to this original philosophy. So they, they have different aspirations. They have different worldview and mindset. And, and that's why the system has to change, I think. Same thing in Saudi Arabia, right? People are just super young. They, they, they know what they want from the internet, basically. And so that's why they, they, they, they also need to adjust. So it's not because the system wants to adjust, it doesn't have a choice. They need to adjust. So, but that's why it's also happening much slower, I think, over there.
Torsten Jacobi: Yeah, I fully agree with that. And I was just in Egypt for a couple of weeks. And I, you can see it in Egypt, too, right? To see this, this huge modern part of Egypt, which is propelled by young people. But I mean, it goes up to the 40s, I feel. And then you have this, this, this other part of Egypt, which kind of clashes with it, which is, you know, very comfortable Muslim values, traditional values, keeping you safe, keeping you in the right mind space, being close to God, which is really what I think the, the most popular philosophy to look at your own country for a long time. And now these young people are there. And they, they kind of, they both just want, I think they just want to be left alone, right? But making a cohesive policy out of this is almost impossible because they're kind of at current philosophy, how we look at the world, they're kind of opposite ends. We see this in Afghanistan right now, right? So we thought it's going to be modern democracy, but oh, you know what, actually, what a good part of their country once is the opposite, which is no democracy and being close to God, being close to Islamic values, being close to Sharia. And that's kind of a surprise, right? So the end of history didn't arrive. Like Fukuyama said, it is the end of history. History is still going on, right? So there's always something new. But talking about something new, I want you to give us an idea of what is really hot in Iran right now. So we know there's a lot of state owned enterprises that are basically probably not your focus, but there must be other great businesses. And we heard of Bitcoin mining, but other businesses that are worth investing into where you think this is really going to rock it the next 10 years, with or without a big catalyst. Where would you, where do you actively research right now what kind of businesses?
Maciej Wojtal: So now there's, you know, the good thing about Iran is, is that it's a, you know, proper economy, well diversified economy. So all this oil and gas is just, you know, maybe 5% of GDP used to be 15, 15 before sanctions. And now it's somewhere, I don't know, in single digits somewhere. So the rest you have, you know, manufacturing services, most of, most of industries, most of sectors are there, because they, they didn't have a choice. They had to develop all the different industries to become, you know, to do as much as possible self sufficient because of the sanctions. So, so, so that basically they could survive all the restrictions put on them. And it worked. And so and so this was one thing, but also they had enough scale, a scale of, you know, again, this 84 million people, but also the export markets that are around them, where Iranians, you know, have have traditional historical connections. Many of these countries speak the same language. So, so it was easy, easy for them to export. So what we are looking for is last four years. And I think right now it's also a similar time that it's, it's worth looking at companies that are basically dollar assets that just happen to be listed in Tehran. So you have exporters or companies that sell domestically, but at prices that are benchmarked against some, some global prices. And whenever the local currency drops depreciates, you know, their revenue just jumps together with the dollar, their earnings accelerate even more because of operational leverage. They keep their costs in depreciated real and their revenue is in dollars. So all the, all the additional, you know, dollar appreciation, all this additional revenue goes straight to, you know, to operating profits. And so, so these are the companies that usually tend to benefit, show the acceleration of profits first when the currency depreciates. And so right now the currency started to depreciate again in the second half, which, which we expected to some extent because there's a couple of factors. Usually after the presidential election, the currency depreciates a bit because they try to stabilize it before the election. Then you had lockdowns again. And lockdowns do have an impact because important sources of hard currency that goes into Iran are, is the regional trade. One, one, one source is the big trade, but this is affected by US sanctions. So whatever Iran was selling to China, Japan, you know, South Korea, European countries, and so on. So to China, they still sell, but, but it's not that easy to, to get payment. And so the regional trade, which is not really affected by sanctions, so whatever goes to Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Uzbek istan, whatever. And this is an important source of hard currency. So when you have lockdowns, then, you know, for a couple of weeks, border crossings are closed, then you don't have enough dollars. And there are some imports, imports of some essential goods that just have to happen, whatever the price of the dollar, right? So, so, so very inelastic. So it will just, you know, the dollar could just jump when there is not enough supply. On paper, the central bank has quite big reserves, or foreign reserves. But in reality, they cannot access access them. So they, whatever they can access is just not enough. So, so, you know, at the end, they have to print money more than they would like to, which, you know, again, fuels inflation, which fuels the depreciation of the local currency. So we have this moment right now, when, again, you had some lockdowns, plus Afghanistan was off for some time. But it's actually going back to normal very quickly from the Iranian point of view. So a week ago, the main border crossing for trade between Iran and Afghanistan was reopened. And now all three, I think, are open and working properly. Afghanistan reduced the customs, custom duties on the Iranian gasoline and oil imports. So, so this has has resumed as well. And, well, I was reading that actually the Taliban leadership was interrun six months ago, you know, before the takeover, basically, of the country. So potentially, you know, there was a deal done at that time that Iran would be very pragmatic, basically, with the relations with Afghanistan. And I think this is what's happening. Same, same for Pakistan, same for, you know, Russia, China, and so on. So, so anyway, so what I wanted to say is that right now you have a couple of factors that affect the the currency. So the dollar is is moving higher. Given the exchange rate of the dollar versus real, and the expected future profits, profits of of the Iranian exporters, well, the share prices are way too low. So easy money right now is to buy by shares of the of the exporters of Iranian exporters. Now, what else is interesting, what is driven by macro and all the last four years were very much driven by macro, were the domestically oriented industries. So companies that were selling domestically were benefiting a lot from sanctions and currency depreciation, because their competitors were just priced out of the market. So when you had the big currency move, you know, even exporters from China were just too expensive. And, and everything, and because of sanctions, everything was getting more difficult. So making the payment, you know, arranging the logistics, and so on. So we saw local companies, even though the whole market was was not growing, was was was stable. The local producers were gaining market share so you could see growth there. And, and, and we were able, because there is so much data being reported by by the local listed companies, that we were able to track this on a monthly basis to understand the volumes per product line, and the unit prices, you know, at which they were selling, to understand, okay, so who is doing better and versus our expectations and so on. So these are, these are, they're actually, you know, they're, as you know, there are many misconceptions about Iran in the West, right? In all areas, right, from misconceptions about the population, where, I don't know, many people or newspapers or media are just trying to portrait Iran as country of terrorists who who hate, you know, Jews and Israel and so on, to, to, you know, good misconceptions about the economy of Iran that is just bleeding and and it's just Venezuela or Zimbabwe and just fall apart and so on, which is obviously all far from from being true. You know, when it comes to population, it's a very tolerant and open society. When you go there and someone speaks any, even as a tourist and someone speaks any English, he will approach you and just to have a chat with you, you have, you know, Catholic Christian churches, Orthodox churches, Jewish synagogues, Zoroastrian, you know, churches, temples, and everyone is doing his own thing in terms of religion. So, so it's absolutely not true that they're like intolerant. So it's actually a very open society and same for the economy, where actually, because of the diversification of the economy, because of the fact that big part of the economy is focused on exports, then focus on exports, they end because of the fact that they just allowed the real to depreciate and didn't fight, you know, to just defend it, you know, with, with, with any reserves they had. They, they helped it to, you know, the local companies to improve competitiveness and, and actually help the, the economy under tough sanctions under Trump. If interesting thing is that unemployment actually went down after under Trump, unemployment in Iran, because manufacturing companies had such, you know, great couple of years, I think there were two years that when they had like record profit growth, that they, they increased employment, you know, they started hiring people. So it was like counterintuitive. But going back to your question. So you, we are looking at a couple of manufacturers that are providing specialized machinery to the, to the domestic petrochemical and steel plants. There is a very big petrochemical and steel industry in Iran. You know, petrochemical industry is probably together with, with the Saudi petrochemical industry. These are the most profitable industries in the world, petrochemical industries. Well, obviously thanks to the cheap gas that they have. Also Iran makes more than a million cars per year. So the steel industry is big and all the related industries as well. And there are companies that provide some specialty, you know, parts machinery to these bigger plants, where those manufacturers have very strong pricing power because, well, because they are so small and specialized in the big picture for the, for the big manufacturers that they don't really care that much about the pricing. And it's also very difficult to import them. So, so they have a good pricing power. It's, they don't have a competition from the foreign competition. So, so we are looking at those. We're looking at some local brands in, in the, in the cleaning products and in the companies that make just everyday equipment, household equipment. And they're also